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NO. 21 MARCH 2021 Introduction 
Responsibility in Supply Chains 
Germany’s Due Diligence Act Is a Good Start 
Günther Maihold, Melanie Müller, Christina Saulich and Svenja Schöneich 
On 3 March, the Federal Cabinet adopted an act on corporate due diligence in supply 
chains. This represents an important step towards German businesses assuming full 
and proper responsibility for the supply chains associated with their goods and ser-
vices. The move puts Germany in a group of European countries like France and the 
Netherlands that have already instituted legal frameworks of their own. However, by 
choosing to exclude civil liability the German government has left aside a powerful 
tool for applying targeted pressure to companies that fail to fulfil their obligations. 
In order to maximise the law’s impact, the German Bundestag and government should 
therefore adopt additional flanking measures. At the European and international 
levels, Germany can also contribute to making companies assume greater responsi-
bility for their own supply chains. 
 
The Due Diligence Act proposed by the Ger-
man government will require companies to 
analyse human rights risks in their supply 
chains, fulfil due diligence und reporting 
obligations, and establish complaints mecha-
nisms. Companies that fail to comply with 
these new regulations face fines. Funda-
mentally, corporate due diligence require-
ments can be defined more or less narrow-
ly, for example to include human rights 
and the impact of business activity on the 
environment. The same applies to civil 
liability for neglecting or failing to address 
risks. On this latter point the involved 
ministries were unable to agree and ulti-
mately opted for a compromise. 
The Components of the Draft Law 
In 2016 the German government made its 
first step towards implementing the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNGP, adopted 2011), by 
passing the National Action Plan for Busi-
ness and Human Rights (NAP). This required 
companies above a certain size to assess and 
address human rights risks in their supply 
chains, to report on measures implemented, 
and to establish complaints mechanisms 
enabling external actors to inform them of 
risks and human rights violations. The NAP 
is a voluntary instrument, with no reper-
cussions for non-compliance. 
A monitoring process conducted by the 
German government found, however, that 
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in 2020 only “13 to 17 percent of the enter-
prises observed complied with the NAP 
requirements”. The new Due Diligence Act 
sets out to create binding rules for business. 
The agreed draft includes the following 
points: 
Affected companies: The legislation will 
apply to companies with more than 3,000 
employees – of which there are about 600 
in Germany – starting in 2023. From 2024 
companies with at least 1,000 employees 
will also be included. 
Reach: Companies will be required to 
ensure that there are no human rights vio-
lations in their immediate business activity 
and the business operations of their direct 
suppliers. Risk analysis in the rest of the 
supply chain (indirect suppliers) is only 
required where a German company is in-
formed about a human rights violation. 
In that event they must also conduct risk 
analysis and institute preventive measures, 
although the requirements are less strin-
gent in these cases. 
Scope of human rights: The legislation 
focuses in particular on the social and po-
litical rights of workers and others imme-
diately affected by business operations. 
Concretely this comprises the right to life, 
health, fair working conditions, and a decent 
standard of living; child protection; free-
dom from slavery and slavery-like working 
conditions; as well as the right of associa-
tion, the right of assembly and the prohibi-
tion of torture. In terms of environmental 
protections, the draft only covers exposure 
to mercury (as defined in the Minamata 
Convention) and persistent organic pollu-
tants (as defined in the Stockholm Conven-
tion). 
Representative action: In the case of viola-
tions of human rights and environmental 
standards at the “far end” of the supply 
chain, for example by the extractive indus-
try, NGOs and trade unions are entitled to 
represent foreign victims of business-related 
abuses who are unable to appear in court 
themselves. 
Enforcement: Rather than civil liability the 
bill proposes fines of up to 2% of the aver-
age annual turnover for companies with 
average annual revenues of more than 
€400 million that fail to meet their obliga-
tions. The maximum fine for companies 
with annual revenues below this threshold is 
€800,000. These fines will be supplemented 
with federal government funds and used to 
promote human rights due diligence in the 
global economy. 
Monitoring: The Federal Office for Eco-
nomic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) 
will be responsible for monitoring com-
pliance and imposing fines. It reports to the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy. 
The Distinction between Due 
Diligence Obligations and Supply 
Chain Responsibility 
Germany is taking an important step for-
ward with its Due Diligence Act, and join-
ing the European front-runners in this area. 
The legislation will require major compa-
nies to take precautions to prevent human 
rights risks and violations. Moreover, the 
enforcement of human rights due diligence 
in their own immediate business operations 
will generate pressure on their suppliers 
and business partners to do the same in 
their own supply chains. 
The German economy is globally signifi-
cant. Germany is the world’s third-largest 
importer, accounting for 6.4 percent – 
worth US$1,234.2 billion. This puts it behind 
only China (10.8 percent) and the United 
States (13.4 percent; both figures as of 2019). 
The German government’s reason for 
limiting due diligence obligations to the 
immediate supply chain and companies 
with more than 3,000 employees is to avoid 
excessive bureaucracy and focus the new 
requirements on entities large enough to 
fulfil them. The legislation seeks to initiate 
a cascade effect by starting with the afore-
mentioned 600 largest companies but ex-
pecting knock-on effects on smaller firms. 
However, restricting corporate risk analy-
sis to the company’s own activities and im-
mediate suppliers significantly curtails the 
reach of the legislation. One prominent 
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example is the area of metal imports. In 
2019 Germany imported basic metals worth 
€56.86 billion and metal products worth 
€30.89 billion. German firms rarely source 
directly from the mine, normally purchas-
ing metals in refined and processed forms. 
Yet most of the human rights violations in 
these supply chains occur in the mines 
themselves, in addition to severe environ-
mental damage caused during the mining 
process. This demonstrates that it is not 
enough to concentrate exclusively on tier-
one suppliers: achieving sustainability 
along the entire supply chain requires a 
more thorough approach. 
The Potential of a “Smart Mix” 
The German system of due diligence is 
based on a combination of internal cor-
porate risk analyses, preventive measures, 
and the mitigation of adverse impacts. The 
idea is that a smart mix – similar to the 
“Green Button” certification mark for tex-
tiles introduced in 2019 – could reduce 
burden of reporting and strengthen existing 
sectoral initiatives. A “smart mix” would 
allow firms to demonstrate partial com-
pliance with certain environmental and 
social standards through certification by 
private-sector organisations. Such forms of 
certification are widely used in the food 
and textile sectors, specifically “Fair Trade” 
and various organic marks. It will be cru-
cial, however, to recognise only ambitious 
standards defined with the participation 
of relevant actors (for example firms, NGOs 
and trade unions in so-called multi-stake-
holder initiatives). Compliance with private 
standards should not release firms from 
conducting internal corporate risk analyses, 
including on-site visits, to avoid a situation 
where the applied standards only cover 
individual human rights and environmen-
tal aspects. Including such standards re-
quires state accreditation, oversight and 
auditing of certification systems. 
A smart mix offers multiple benefits. 
Firstly, it would reward companies that set 
ambitious targets. Secondly, it would pro-
mote the dissemination and establishment 
of exacting standards. Thirdly, new binding 
sectoral standards could be developed in 
sectoral dialogues with BAFA, companies 
and civil society actors. These would have 
knock-on effects on smaller firms that are 
not yet directly affected by the legislation. 
BAFA would be able to prevent the prolif-
eration of a confusing multitude of parallel 
standards, while granting companies a 
degree of freedom in how they implement 
their due diligence obligations. 
Strengthen Civil Society 
Participation 
The legislation provides for NGO and trade 
union involvement in a central aspect, the 
possibility to represent foreign victims in 
court. But effective implementation will 
require civil society participation elsewhere 
too. 
Risk analysis and prevention: Requiring 
firms to conduct risk analyses and institute 
preventive measures faces them with new 
operational and logistical challenges – 
and opens opportunities to improve their 
knowledge of their own supply chains and 
minimise possible risks. Drawing on the 
expertise of the diverse actors along the 
supply chains is crucial to identifying and 
preventing risks in an adequate manner. 
Discussion in multi-stakeholder forums will 
be central to harnessing the existing knowl-
edge of these actors. 
Monitoring compliance: It certainly makes 
sense for the state authority BAFA to have 
a robust mandate to ensure obligations are 
fulfilled. This will also enable the state to 
acquire data and expertise. Verifying com-
pliance requires extensive knowledge about 
the different raw materials, global supply 
chains and their actors, as well as the con-
ditions in production, processing and manu-
facturing, and the human rights violations 
typically associated with them. Miscalcula-
tions of risks, for instance when granting 
state guarantees to secure untied loans by 
German-based banks for resource extraction 
projects, raise questions whether the re-
quired competence has (yet) been adequately 
established at the state level. The involve-
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ment of civil society actors with an addi-
tional control function is therefore an 
important addition. 
Managing funds for human rights due dili-
gence: The participation of civil society 
actors in detecting risks in supply chains, 
monitoring corporate compliance and 
representing victims in court requires 
human and financial resources. The funds 
earmarked for promoting human rights due 
diligence could be used for that purpose. 
Funding decisions should also play out in 
a multi-stakeholder context involving trade 
unions, civil society organisations and busi-
ness representatives. The fund could repre-
sent a legislative innovation and a litmus 
test for the seriousness of the desire to 
integrate a wide spectrum of stakeholders. 
It could also finance support and targeted 
assistance for persons affected by human 
rights violations so as to account for Ger-
many’s own share of responsibility for 
human rights abuses. Solid participation by 
the various actors will only be possible if 
the fund receives stable baseline funding 
from the outset, and is not forced to rely 
solely on fines and government top-ups. 
Strengthening Organisations 
on the Ground 
The proposed complaint and representative 
action processes will be important for secur-
ing a legal representation of marginalised 
groups affected by human rights violations 
associated with economic activity. Prepar-
ing complaints and court cases requires 
the aggregation of knowledge and evidence 
about human rights violations on the 
ground, and a certain degree of organisa-
tion of the victims at the local level. It also 
presupposes the formation of transnational 
networks between German NGOs, trade 
unions and the victims and/or their organi-
sations. This creates openings for German 
development cooperation: measures that 
could strengthen the participation of local 
actors include supporting local civil society 
organisations and research bodies that 
represent victims of human rights viola-
tions and environmental damage, gather 
information, or participate in preparing 
complaints and court cases. Other flanking 
measures in the sphere of development 
cooperation could be directed towards 
establishing and expanding local institu-
tions that process complaints, such as 
ombudspersons and national human rights 
institutes. Institutions of that nature in 
countries like Peru and Chile already con-
tribute to safeguarding basic rights in the 
mining sector and enjoy strong popular 
legitimacy. 
As well as supporting victims and vul-
nerable groups, such local bodies are also 
important resources for corporate risk 
analyses and prevention. Highly complex 
supply chains with numerous stages involv-
ing multiple actors are often rather impen-
etrable for the companies responsible for 
analysing them. Conflicts of interest be-
tween actors generally lead to elevated risk 
for the resilience of the supply chain and 
thus also for the firms involved. Collective 
representation of interests at the local level 
gives companies reliable partners and in 
turn increases the potential for productive 
cooperation and greater transparency. 
Strengthening local organisations is there-
fore not only in the interest of German 
development cooperation, but of the com-
panies as well. 
Differences between the German 
and European Debates 
The German Due Diligence Act will put 
Germany in a group with EU member states 
like France and the Netherlands, which 
have already passed comparable legislation. 
The French »Loi de Vigilance« came into 
force in 2017 and introduces the principle 
of civil liability; the first cases are already 
in process. At the European level there is 
a broad consensus behind ambitious legis-
lation on corporate due diligence: In De-
cember 2020 the Council of the EU asked 
the Commission to initiate an EU Action 
Plan in the course of 2021, “focusing on 
shaping global supply chains sustainably, 
promoting human rights, social and en-
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vironmental due diligence standards and 
transparency”. In its Conclusions of 1 De-
cember 2020 the Council also called on 
the Commission to prepare a proposal for 
“an EU legal framework on sustainable cor-
porate governance, including cross-sector 
corporate due diligence obligations along 
global supply chains”. On March 10 the 
European Parliament voted by a large 
majority to accept a legislative initiative 
report in favour of due diligence legislation. 
The report states that businesses need to 
ensure that their purchasing policies do 
not cause harm and proposes fines and 
other administrative sanctions in case of 
non-compliance or complaints. The law 
is expected to be tabled in June 2021. This 
means that, while Germany is not pre-
empting European regulation, it will have 
to adapt its national arrangements to con-
form to the future European legal frame-
work. The discussion about a European cor-
porate due diligence law diverges from the 
German Due Diligence Act in two main 
respects: 
Reach: The discussion in the European 
Parliament – and the Commission – pro-
poses far-reaching obligations applying to 
indirect as well as direct suppliers. There is 
still debate over a proportionality principle 
to scale corporate reporting and tracing 
duties according to risk. The alternative 
would be to make company size the criterion 
for formal procedures and risk assessment 
and prevention, potentially complemented 
by independent external certification sys-
tems to reduce the reporting burden. 
Enforcement: In January 2021 the Legal 
Affairs Committee of the European Parlia-
ment voted almost unanimously to adopt 
a draft legislative initiative calling on the 
Commission to present a corporate due 
diligence law. Justice Commissioner Didier 
Reynders has repeatedly announced his 
intention to propose cross-sectoral rules. 
The public consultation has just ended, and 
the legislative proposal is expected in the 
second quarter of 2021. The legislative ini-
tiative report of the European Parliament 
includes corporate civil and administrative 
liability, which the German bill excludes. 
The European proposal suggests a corporate 
duty comparable to the “comply or explain” 
principle in banking supervision in a Euro-
pean directive. This would require firms 
to justify any non-fulfilment of their due 
diligence obligations to their national over-
sight body. The point of common minimum 
due diligence obligations and liability 
arrangements is to avoid regulatory frag-
mentation as well as material and proces-
sual discrepancies in the internal market. 
On the other hand, it would not prevent 
member states from adopting special (for 
instance sectoral) due diligence require-
ments that go further than the joint EU 
rules; the same also applies to current and 
future regional and international standards. 
The regulatory depth and compliance 
requirements of the German governing 
coalition compromise thus fall well short 
of the stringency of the proposed European 
corporate due diligence law in its current 
iteration. The legal implications of the lat-
ter would in specific cases lead to the ter-
mination of particular suppliers if reported 
risks were not remedied. There is also dis-
cussion about an import ban for products 
associated with grave human rights viola-
tions (such as child labour). 
Germany’s Potential Role in the 
EU Discussion 
Germany has a number of different paths 
to choose between. The government could 
join with trade unions and companies that 
already fulfil their due diligence obligation 
to forge the path to an ambitious Europe-
wide solution with stricter liability, firm 
enforcement and a comprehensive directive 
to be implemented in national legislation. 
Given that the European legislative initia-
tive report enjoys cross-party support, the 
timeframe for implementation could be 
kept short. That would also support efforts 
already under way to have standards, 
reporting duties and the associated costs 
included in company accounts. And it 
would make full use of the potential of a 
multi-stakeholder approach for governing 
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due diligence processes: The inclusion of 
public and state actors in consultation and 
participation processes would benefit cor-
porate implementation, not least with 
respect to pressure from financial markets 
and investors. 
Rules should apply across the EU to 
ensure that a European corporate due dili-
gence law harmonises the existing national 
laws and regulations and prevents unfair 
competition in the European Union. That 
means ensuring that the rules that apply 
to EU-based companies are also applied to 
non-EU-based companies operating in the 
European Single Market. A European direc-
tive could represent a meaningful next step, 
closing the gaps in the German law. The idea 
of channelling fines into a fund to promote 
human rights due diligence, as proposed in 
the German bill, could enrich the European 
discussion. 
Germany, as a key trading power, could 
adopt an active pathfinding role within the 
European legislative process. A comprehen-
sive corporate due diligence law would 
allow Germany and the EU to increase the 
pressure on China – which is a central 
node in many supply chains – to observe 
environmental and social standards. Beijing 
has recently adopted its own guidelines 
for sustainable commerce orientated on the 
existing OECD standards. But enforcement 
has been weak to date, due to the lack of 
pressure from the authoritarian leadership. 
An overly cautious German stance – 
coloured by fears in parts of the business 
community that the expense of reporting 
and research could increase costs and im-
pinge on competitiveness – would also 
weaken the EU’s position at the inter-
national level, for example in the UN nego-
tiations for a Binding Treaty on Business 
and Human Rights. That would leave Ger-
many less able to align itself with actors in 
states of the Global South. The argument 
that strong human rights obligations would 
place a disproportionate burden on these 
countries is unconvincing. States across 
the globe have implemented the UNGP in 
national law with National Action Plans 
on Business and Human Rights, or are dis-
cussing doing so. The OECD’s more ambi-
tious standards already apply to member 
states like Chile and accession candidates 
like Peru, while the African Union’s Agenda 
2063 also codifies implementation of social 
and environmental standards as an objec-
tive. 
Next Steps 
Aside from human rights, there are other 
benefits to pursuing high social and en-
vironmental standards. A steadily growing 
market for sustainable and fairly traded 
products has emerged and grown substan-
tially in recent years. For instance, an Infra-
test dimap survey in Germany published 
in September 2020 found that 75 percent 
support a supply chain law. 91 percent 
believe it is the responsibility of the govern-
ment to ensure that German companies 
respect social and environmental standards 
abroad. 
A Plea for a Strong German Law 
It is important to take seriously the con-
cerns over costs and competitive disad-
vantages associated with stronger regula-
tion in certain business areas, and to shape 
processes that avoid creating excessive 
bureaucracy. In fact that is a very good 
argument for strong legislation, because it 
will create a guiding framework with clear 
and binding rules. The cornerstones of the 
bill as it now stands should not be watered 
down any further in the legislative process. 
Flanking Measures 
The German government should also en-
hance the legislation’s impact and reach 
with flanking measures. Specifically, it 
should seek the participation of actors 
along the supply chain in corporate risk 
analyses, in compliance monitoring and 
in the allocation of funding to strengthen 
human rights due diligence. Restricting the 
reporting duty to direct business partners 
must not lead to a situation where atten-
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tion is paid to further removed elements 
of the supply chain only in the event of a 
complaint. The goal must still be to prevent 
such cases through comprehensive and 
binding risk analyses. That will also im-
prove supply chain transparency and trace-
ability and thus resilience. The support of 
local institutions that gather knowledge 
about human rights violations attributable 
to corporate activity and support victims is 
also important. 
Germany at the European level 
At the European level Germany should 
press for strong regulation and ensure that 
the same rules apply to EU-based and non-
EU-based companies and that the EU can 
play a leading role internationally. It 
should also work to have environmental 
human rights adequately anchored in the 
European legislation. The restriction to spe-
cific substances and environmental harm 
affecting only individual human rights – 
as in the German legislation – fails to 
adequately address the extent of environ-
mental damage attributable to corporate 
activity. Additional approaches for streng-
thening the implementation and enforce-
ment of human rights standards should be 
developed in dialogue with partner coun-
tries in the Global South. 
Complementarity with 
Trade Policy 
In the interest of coherence in its external 
relations the EU should work to address the 
issue of complementarity of supply chain 
regulation and trade policy. The preventive 
character of a corporate due diligence law, 
which functions by regulating corporate 
behaviour, can be complemented by bi-
lateral, inter-regional and international 
trade agreements. That could mean up-
dating existing trade agreements or includ-
ing corresponding arrangements in multi-
lateral trade law. Reviving the World Trade 
Organisation could also generate new open-
ings for a European initiative. 
Use the German G7 Presidency 
The German government could also use its 
G7 presidency in 2022 to discuss the issue 
of sustainability in supply chains with its 
G7 partners and to develop a joint frame-
work for action. It should insist that cor-
porate due diligence forms part of the G7 
countries’ relationships with governments 
and civil society actors in the Global South. 
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